The paper investigates whether free capital mobility leads a government to tighten its budget deficit for fear of being penalized from the international capital market. The author tests the hypothesis using three-stage least squares (3SLS), which can control for the endogenous nature of capital account liberalization. Even the conservative measure shows that, if capital account liberalization were exogenously imposed, ceteris paribus, government budget deficit would be reduced by 2.275% of GDP. Furthermore, 3SLS results show that this disciplinary effect is stronger for countries under a fixed exchange rate regime or for countries with weak central bank independence.The disciplinary effect is also found to be stronger in more recent periodsthe 1990s-during which capital market integration has been most prevalent.
Introduction
Members of the international financial community have been frequently asserting the existence of a disciplinary effect that cross-border capital transactions have upon national economic policies. They argue that unrestricted movements of capital can prevent governments from pursuing bad policies, if market judgments are right. For instance, the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer (1998) , said:
"International capital flows tend to be highly sensitive to macroeconomic policies, to the soundness of the banking system, and to economic and political developments. Accordingly, market forces can exert a disciplining influence on macroeconomic policies. Normally, when the market's judgement is right, this discipline is valuable, rewarding good policies and penalizing bad." Convincingly, there are a handsome number of episodes where countries lift controls on capital transactions, while tightening their fiscal policies in the subsequent years. For example, the United Kingdom abolished its residual capital controls in 1979 and its fiscal budget improved from a deficit of 5.23% of GDP in 1978 to a surplus of 1.22% of GDP in 1988 . Uruguay, which abolished its control on capital transactions in 1976, witnessed its budget balance change from a deficit of 1.2% of GDP in 1973 to a surplus of 0.03% of GDP in 1980. 1 More recently, in October 1998, Brazil launched a three-year fiscal austerity program to restore confidence against speculative attacks on its currency, the real. In 1999 alone, this package was supposed to save 23.5 billion US dollars from the government budget. 2 This paper empirically investigates the hypothesis that capital account liberalization disciplines budget deficits: that is, whether free capital mobility leads a government to tighten its fiscal policy for fear of being punished by the international capital market. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, Garrett (1996) shows that increased
The Data
Three different panel (longitudinal) datasets are used in this paper. The first one (dataset I) consists of 54 industrial and developing countries from 1950 to 1989. The second (dataset II) consists of 20 OECD countries from 1951 to 1990. The third (dataset III) includes 20 OECD countries from 1950 to 1994. For the list of countries included in the analyses, see Table 1 . Dataset I has an advantage of covering a wider number of countries, while datasets II and III use a measure of capital account Eichengreen and Mussa (1998) , three problems emerge with this dummy variable. First, it does not measure the "degree" of liberalization. It takes a value of either 0 or 1 and nothing in-between. Second, it underestimates the true level of capital account liberalization because it takes a value of 1 for fully liberalized countries, while 0 not only for the nonliberalized, but also for the partially liberalized. Third, it mainly captures liberalization on capital outflows because it refers to resident-owned funds only.
To overcome the first and the second problem, I first assigned 0.5 for those countries that have liberalized their current account, but not the capital account, given that many countries in this category have at least partially liberalized their capital account. Uruguay and Argentina fall in this category (Sjaastad, 1983; Mathieson and RojasSuarez, 1993) . Then I computed five-year nonoverlapping averages when actually analyzing the dataset. Consequently, the resulting variable, denoted as CAPLIB II, takes ten values from 0 to 1 with 0.1 increments.
In datasets II and III, I use the capital account liberalization index originally measured by Quinn and Inclán (1997) . Drawing on the information contained in the country-by-country descriptions of foreign exchange restrictions in the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, they constructed a measure taking eight values from 0 to 4 with 0.5 increments. More specifically, liberalization on exchange receipts and payments of capital are first separately measured from 0 to 2 with 0.5 increments according to the degree of restriction and then added up to have eight values from 0 to 4 with 0.5 increments. Their measure of capital account liberalization addresses all three problems mentioned above. First, it measures the degree of liberalization; second, it does not underestimate liberalization; and third, it also measures liberalization of capital inflows. However, this measure is publicly available only for 21 OECD countries from 1950 to 1992 at the time of this paper's writing. Hereafter this measure will be denoted as CAPLIB III, and to make easy comparison with the other measure (CAPLIB II), it will be scaled to have a value between 0 and 1.
The dependent variable, budget deficit, is defined as the central government's budget deficit over GDP expressed in percentage terms. Data on budget deficit is taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. For detailed descriptions and sources of other variables, see the Appendix. Figure 1 depicts scatter plots with their corresponding fitted regression lines between budget deficit (% of GDP) and capital account liberalization. To smooth the discreteness of the capital account liberalization variable, observations are averaged over the whole sample period for each country and then a pure cross-sectional regression line, with one independent variable (besides the constant), is estimated. The first plot is drawn using dataset I, and the second plot is drawn using dataset II. From the plots, one can easily see that the lines are downward-sloping, suggesting that budget deficit (% of GDP) decreases with greater degree of liberalization. The slopes are -1.65 for the first plot and -4.70 for the second. 
Results

3SLS Estimation
As mentioned in the introduction, the main feature of this paper is to distinguish other possible explanations from the disciplinary effect by adopting 3SLS. First, by using a set of instrumental variables, I estimate the true contemporaneous feedback effects between capital account liberalization and budget balance, thus correcting for the causality bias (or simultaneity bias). Accordingly, 3SLS will uncover whether the concern that high budget deficit has a negative effect on capital account liberalization is valid or not. Second, by constructing an instrument exclusively with known exogenous variables, there is no room for an unknown common factor to influence liberalization decision and budget deficit at the same time, thus correcting for the unknown third-factor bias (omitted-variable bias). Third, making use of the correlation information between the disturbance terms in the equations of capital account liberalization and budget balance, it gives more efficient estimators. The following is the basic 3SLS specification I use in this paper.
(1)
Variable X includes all the exogenous variables common to both equations. Besides a constant, fixed-country effects, and fixed-period effects, it includes political and policy variables that explain budget deficit and capital account liberalization. Detailed descriptions of such variables are explained in the following subsection and in the Appendix. From equations (1) and (2), one can see that the system is identified by having variable trade openness in the budget deficit equation, while not in the capital account liberalization equation, and having current account liberalization in the capital account liberalization, while not in the budget deficit equation. I do not assume any further exclusion restriction, which makes the specification least restrictive.
Such exclusion restrictions can be justified from the existing literature. Rodrik (1996) and other trade literature show evidence that countries with high degrees of trade openness are more likely to have large budget deficits (or government expenditures). On the other hand, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) argue that the effect of trade on the decision to liberalize capital accounts is ambiguous at best. First, monitoring capital flows is more difficult in a very open economy, which makes it infeasible to impose capital control. Following this argument, trade openness has a positive effect on capital account liberalization. Second, the more open the economy is, the larger are the effects of an external shock on the domestic economy, so that the incentive to insulate the economy from an external shock through capital control becomes stronger. This argument suggests that openness has a negative effect on capital account liberalization.
The exclusion restriction regarding current account liberalization can be justified by the fact that countries that have liberalized their current account find it administratively difficult to control capital transactions. As such, data show that countries that have liberalized their current account are more likely to liberalize their capital account as well than are those countries that have not liberalized even their current account. On the other hand, it is hard to convince oneself that liberalization of current account will discipline government's fiscal policy.
When using dataset II, which has an annual frequency, certain variables with the suspicion of endogeneity are lagged by one year to make them predetermined. In the case of dataset I, five-year nonoverlapping averages are computed for each variable to dampen the serial correlation problem.
Disciplinary Effect
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 display the estimation results of 3SLS using five-year nonoverlapping averaged data for the 54 industrial and developing countries. Note that the coefficient on CAPLIB II in the budget equation is negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient value of -2.2750 implies that, all else equal, during 1950-89, a full capital account liberalization would have reduced the budget deficit by 2.275% of GDP. On the other hand, the coefficient on budget deficit in the capital account liberalization equation is small and insignificant, thus invalidating the concern that budget deficit might have a negative effect on capital account liberalization. Also note that variables excluded from one of the equations such as trade openness and current account liberalization (CURLIB I) all have the expected signs with the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively. A number of explanatory variables are included in each of the equations. Mean number of government changes is included in the budget deficit equation to capture the strategic effect of debt. According to the models of debt as a strategic variable, political parties intentionally increase debt so that their opponents that take over the government in the next period will be subject to tighter budget constraints (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) . This model predicts that countries with short-lived governments Notes: All variables are in five-year nonoverlapping averages. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
would have higher debt. Column (1) in Table 2 , however, shows that the coefficient on government changes is not statistically significant. Mean number of government coalitions is also included as an explanatory variable for budget deficit. According to the models of distributional conflict within a coalition government, it is rational for polarized political parties within the coalition to delay fiscal adjustment if the proposed plan is inequitable or the two groups are not informed about the other's strength (Alesina and Drazin, 1991) . Column (1) in Table 2 shows that the coefficient on government coalition has the expected positive sign with 1% statistical significance.
Current account surplus is included in the budget deficit equation because a large current account deficit implies a greater number of people disadvantaged from international trade, which necessitates more public spending to compensate their income (Rodrik, 1998) . Column (1) in Table 2 shows that the coefficient on current account surplus has the expected negative sign with 1% statistical significance.
An exchange rate regime dummy (1 if fixed) is included in the budget deficit equation following the conventional wisdom that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates. Sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg. Column (1) in Table 2 , however, shows that the coefficient has the wrong sign, but is not statistically significant.
A central bank independence dummy (1 if independent) is included in the budget deficit equation to capture one of the institutional determinants of budget deficit. With central bank independence, a government must finance its budget deficit by issuing bonds to the public instead of printing money. If the government acts rationally, it would keep down the deficit level in face of a now-present debt service burden (Alesina and Perotti, 1994) . Column (1) in Table 2 shows that the coefficient on central bank independence has the expected negative sign with 5% statistical significance.
Mean number of leftist governments is included in the budget deficit equation because leftists or socialist governments tend to spend more for social security purposes, and thus end up having a greater budget deficit. Column (1) in Table 2 shows that the coefficient on leftist government has the expected positive sign with 1% statistical significance.
In the capital account liberalization equation, mean number of government changes and coalition governments are included based on the argument that governments with political unrest are likely to abstain from capital account liberalization for fear that it may lead to capital outflow. Column (2) in Table 2 shows that mean number of government changes has the expected sign with 5% statistical significance. The coefficient on the mean number of coalition governments, however, is not significant. Current account surplus is included in the equation for the argument that countries with large current account deficits are more vulnerable to external shocks, which forces the government to impose capital control to insulate the economy. Column (2) in Table  2 shows that the coefficient on current account surplus has the expected positive sign with 10% statistical significance.
The exchange rate regime dummy (1 if fixed) is included in the capital account liberalization equation for the argument that a flexible exchange rate system makes it easier, ceteris paribus, to manage the liberalized capital account regime. This is based on the well-known Mundell-Fleming impossibility triangle (Frieden, 1991; Quinn and Inclán, 1997) . Column (2) in Table 2 , however, shows that the coefficient on the exchange rate regime dummy is not significant.
The central bank independence dummy (1 if independent) is included in the capital account liberalization equation for three reasons. When the central bank is independent, a government's motivation to impose capital control to levy inflation tax decreases (Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) . Moreover, Epstein and Schor (1992) argue that central bank independence reflects the power of financial sector interests, which oppose limitations to capital mobility. Furthermore, an independent central bank can imply more credibility of the government's monetary policy stance and therefore make speculative attack less likely, which lessens the need for capital controls (Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) . Column (2) in Table 2 , however, shows that the coefficient on central bank independence is not significant.
Mean number of leftist governments is included in the capital liberalization equation because leftist (or socialist) governments attempting to redistribute resources from capital to labor may want to impose capital controls in order to avoid capital flight (Epstein and Schor, 1992; Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Quinn and Inclán, 1997) . Column (2) in Table 2 , however, shows that the coefficient on the mean number of leftist governments is not significant.
In Table 3 , I report estimation results of 3SLS using dataset II (20 OECD countries). Notice that right-hand-side variables are lagged by one year to make them predetermined. For this reason, the dataset starts from 1951, instead of 1950, and ends in 1990, instead of 1989. The results are basically the same as in Table 2 . It shows that capital account liberalization has a negative effect on budget deficit, while the effect of budget deficit on capital account liberalization is small. The coefficient value of -4.1659 on CAPLIB III implies that, all else equal, during 1951-90, a full capital account liberalization would have reduced budget deficits by 4.1659% of GDP. Notice that the coefficient on CAPLIB III in Table 3 is greater than that on CAPLIB II in Table 2 . One explanation is that the capital market is much more integrated among industrialized countries, and this is showing up as a stronger disciplinary effect.
Determinants of Disciplinary Effect
In this subsection, I interact two different dummy variables with CAPLIB II, to see what determines the strength of the disciplinary effect. 3SLS is run and dataset I is used. First, I interact the exchange rate regime dummy with CAPLIB II to see under what exchange rate regime disciplinary effect is stronger. I expect it is stronger under a fixed exchange rate system. It is asserted that fixed exchange rate regimes (except for currency board arrangements and currency unions) are not sustainable in the face of high capital mobility. Studies show that fixed exchange rate regimes have been sustained historically for only ten months on average (Klein and Marion, 1994; Eichengreen et al., 1998) . Thus, I expect capital account liberalization on top of a fixed exchange rate regime is unsustainable and prone to crisis. I also expect that such countries will try not to have lax fiscal policies that can make the country vulnerable to crisis. Note that exchange rate regime dummy II takes a value of 1 if a five-year nonoverlapping average of exchange rate regime dummy I is equal to or greater than 0.75, which is the sample mean of exchange rate regime dummy I.
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the result. It turns out that the coefficient on the interacted variable is -3.9908 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the disciplinary effect of capital account liberalization is stronger under a fixed exchange rate regime (or regime with limited flexibility). In fact, the coefficient value of 1.0827 on CAPLIB II suggests that the disciplinary effect does not exist under a floating regime, while it is strong under a fixed regime.
Column (2) of Table 4 reports the result when the central bank legal independence dummy is interacted with CAPLIB II. One can reason that a central bank with weak legal independence would be more prone to purchase government debt and bring about inflation. Taking this as given, I expect capital account liberalization on top of weak central bank independence is unsustainable and prone to crisis. I also expect that such countries will try not to have lax fiscal policies that can make the country vulnerable to crisis. Note that the central bank independence dummy II takes a value of 1 when a five-year nonoverlapping average of central bank independence dummy I is equal to or greater than 0.35, which is the sample mean of central bank independence dummy I.
It turns out that the coefficient on the interacted variable is 5.0326 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the disciplinary effect is weaker for countries with stronger central bank legal independence. In fact, the coefficient value of -4.4775 on CAPLIB II suggests that the disciplinary effect is very strong in countries with weak central bank legal independence, while it does not exist in countries with strong central bank independence (0.5551 = -4.4775 + 5.0326). 
Intensity of Disciplinary Effect in the 1990s
In this subsection, I employ dataset III, which covers 20 OECD countries from 1950 to 1994, and test whether the disciplinary effect, discovered in the previous subsections, intensifies during the 1990s. Given that capital market integration has been most prevalent in the 1990s, it is expected that the disciplinary effect is greater in that period.
4 Table 5 shows the budget deficit equations of 3SLS estimation. Notice that all variables are in five-year nonoverlapping averages. In equation (2), CAPLIB II interacts with a period dummy that takes a value of 1 if the period is in the 1990s and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the interacted variable shows to what extent the disciplinary effect became stronger in the 1990s compared to the previous period.
It turns out that the coefficient on the interacted variables in equation (2) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 3SLS result shows that budget deficit falls by 2.317% of GDP before the 1990s, but it falls by 9.061% of GDP during the 1990s, suggesting a greater disciplinary effect in the 1990s. One qualification is that among the industrialized countries, the decision to reduce budget deficits in the 
Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the hypothesis that capital account liberalization disciplines budget deficit by adopting three-stage least squares (3SLS), which can control for the endogenous nature of capital account liberalization. It turns out that, even when controlling for other factors, the disciplinary effect of capital account liberalization upon budget deficit still survives. Even the most conservative measure shows that, if capital account liberalization were exogenously imposed, ceteris paribus, government budget deficit would have reduced by 2.275% of GDP. Furthermore, analyses show that this disciplinary effect is stronger for countries under a fixed exchange rate regime and for countries with weak central bank independence. The disciplinary effect is also found to be stronger in the later period of the sample-the early 1990s-during which capital market integration became more prevalent. Results also invalidate the concern that high budget deficit might negatively effect capital account liberalization. -years (1950-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85-89) Average of month over a 10-year period (1950-59, 60-69, 70-79, 80-89, 90-94) Source: Lane et al. (1997) Number of parties in the Effective number of parties in parliament. It takes into government account not just the number of parties but also their strength Average over a five-year period (1950-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-94) Source: Lane et al. (1997) Variables Description and source Electoral strength of Average over a five-year period (1950-54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, socialist parties 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-94 
